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ABSTRACT
In the face of pressure from civil society, unions and consumers to improve
labour standards for the workers producing their goods, companies at the
helm of global garment supply chains have made commitments to pay
living wages within their supply chains. Harnessing insights from the
critical political economy literature on corporate social responsibility
(CSR), we investigate the actions of garment companies to meet these
commitments. We do so through analysis of original data from a survey
of 20 leading garment companies, which we co-developed in 2018–
2019, as well as publicly available information for garment companies
and relevant multi-stakeholder initiatives. Based on this data, we argue
there is very little evidence to suggest companies have made
meaningful progress towards achieving commitments to pay living
wages in their supply chains, challenging widespread assumptions
about CSR’s benefits to workers. We argue that in the face of mounting
evidence of CSR ineffectiveness, including our own, there is a need for
new political economy research into the benefits that companies derive
from CSR commitments that deflect attention from their core business








Multi-national garment corporations have long faced criticism over labour rights violations in their
supply chains. In recent decades, endemic worker rights violations have been documented including
wage theft and violations (Anner et al. 2013, Anner 2019), gender-based violence (Evans 2017,
Selwyn et al. 2019), unsafe working conditions and dangerous levels of productivity (Merk 2011b,
Mezzadri 2017), and infringements on freedom of association (Egels-Zandén and Merk 2014,
Anner 2017). For over two decades, civil society, unions, workers, and policymakers have exerted sus-
tained pressure on the multi-national corporations (MNCs) leading fashion supply chains to address
these infringements improve labour standards (cf. Saxena 2019).
One commitment companies have made in response to such pressures is to pay living wages
within their supply chains. Living wages are important because they provide sufficient income to
cover essentials for workers (e.g. food, housing, medical insurance), and because they can be a
key protective factor in preventing more serious forms of labour abuse such as forced labour
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(LeBaron et al. 2018, LeBaron 2020). They can also enable workers in low-waged work to upgrade
their position within supply chains (Phillips 2011, Phillips 2013). As such, corporate commitments
to deliver living wages across global supply chains carry potentially important economic impacts
for workers and their families, particularly in countries where production for export is a major com-
ponent of industrial strategy. In a context in which MNCs are taking on functions and powers tra-
ditionally exercised by states, and given the links between global supply chains and inequality,
MNC commitments to pay living wages merit investigation.
This is especially true in the garment industry, where nearly four decades of research document
sub-standard wages (Weil and Mallo 2007, Chan and Siu 2010); furthermore, the industry employs an
estimated 60m people worldwide (with 80% of the workforce estimated to be women) and is heavily
concentrated in low and lower-middle income countries (ILO 2019), so living wages would reverbe-
rate through the economy. Several garment MNCs have made living wage commitments over the
last decade. For instance, in 2013, H&M set public goals for paying a ‘fair living wage’ in its supply
chain (DePillis 2013), while PVH (owner of brands including Calvin Klein and Tommy Hilfiger)
stated ‘a goal of paying all workers no less than a living wage’ (PVH 2020).
To advance understandings of the potential for voluntary corporate commitments to living wages
to address social problems in global supply chains, in this article, we investigate garment company
MNCs commitments to pay living wages, actions taken to realise these, and whether these commit-
ments are translating into living wages for workers on-the-ground. Empirically, we present original
data from a survey of 20 leading garment companies (see Table 1), which we co-developed with the
Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC), a global network of organisations that campaigns for improved
rights for garment workers (see ‘Research Approach’). Additionally, we draw on publicly available
information for garment companies and relevant multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) operating in
the garment industry focused on delivering higher wages.
Based on this data, we argue there is very little evidence to suggest companies have made mean-
ingful progress towards achieving commitments to pay living wages in their supply chains. Amongst
other problems, our data shows that companies have outsourced their living wage commitments to
MSIs while failing to modify commercial practices that give rise to low wages in their supply chains.
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) efforts are also diluting and distorting the definition of ‘living
wage’ thus making it challenging for consumers and policy-makers to determine whether living
wages are truly being paid.
Our study contributes to theory about the role of CSR, and the business interests served by it. We
build on existing political economy theory about the limits of social compliance regime— which
revolves around CSR tools like social auditing, ethical certification, and codes of conduct— in bolster-
ing labour standards (cf. Soederberg 2007, Taylor 2011, Esbenshade 2012, Fransen 2012, Egels-
Table 1. Responses to the CCC survey.
Completed the
survey (14)
Did not complete the survey but provided some relevant
information on the survey themes (5)
Did not complete the survey and did not
provide any information (1)
Adidas Amazon Hugo Boss















2 G. LEBARON ET AL.
Zandén and Lindholm 2015, LeBaron 2020) and we challenge theories that view CSR as a neutral and
pragmatic response to governance gaps created amidst globalisation as states have either refused or
been unable to institute and enforce labour standards, or as a slowly-working, incrementally
effective form of governance (cf. Vogel 2005; for political economy critiques see Cutler et al. 1999;
Dauvergne and LeBaron 2014, Lund-Thomsen 2020). We highlight the limits of dominant
approaches to studying CSR that prioritise procedural questions such as about initiative design, strin-
gency, and interactions rather than performance or outcomes (cf. Henson and Humphrey 2010,
Klassen and Vereecke 2012, Ibanez and Blackman 2016, Glinksi 2017, Graafland and Smid 2019, Mar-
shall et al. 2019) over investigations of CSR effectiveness, both on-the-ground and in terms of evol-
ving company policies and practices.
We seek to move the literature forward by analysing the dark sides of CSR. We add further weight
to claims that corporations derive legitimacy from CSR commitments that deflect attention from
exploitative business models (Hanlon and Fleming 2009, Clarke and Boersma 2017) and that MSIs
can obfuscate corporate inactivity towards meeting CSR commitments (Dauvergne and LeBaron
2014) by showing that MNCs strategically use CSR to fend off criticism of their business models
and supply chain dynamics while refusing to redistribute value down the supply chain in the
form of higher wages for workers. We challenge the conventional assumption that ‘something is
better than nothing’ when it comes to CSR and stress the dangers that these governance dynamics
pose to low-waged workers who face significant barriers to exercising their rights. In doing so, we
seek to advance political economy scholarship on the negative role of CSR including its use to facili-
tate and consolidate the power of large corporations (Banerjee 2008), undermine sovereignty of
countries in the global South (Clapp 1998, Fridell 2007, De Neve 2009), and construct superficial
forms of governance that preserve status quo business models while failing to promote real
change for workers (LeBaron 2020).
The article is organised as follows. We first outline our research approach. We then describe how
the interdisciplinary literature on CSR has tended to understand and investigate social compliance
efforts, including MSIs, and how we move theory about CSR’s role within supply chain governance
forward. We proceed to describe our empirical analysis and findings. The article ends with a summa-
tive conclusion.
2. Research approach
2.1. Definition of living wage
There are competing and contested definitions for what precisely constitutes a living wage. Most
converge around the idea that a living wage should cover ‘basic’ needs of both a worker and
their family beyond ‘mere subsistence’ (Parker et al. 2016) in a way that is suitable for their geo-
graphical situation (Glasmeier 2004, Anker and Anker 2017). This is enshrined in wage standards
set by international organisations. For instance, the International Labour Organization (ILO) Consti-
tution preamble notes the need for ‘an adequate living wage’ (ILO 1919), while its Minimum Wage
Convention 131 refers to ‘the needs of workers and their families’ and a ‘satisfactory standard of
living’ (ILO 1970a) and its Minimum Wage Fixing Recommendation 135 specifies this must cover
‘more than subsistence needs’ (ILO 1970b). The United Nations (UN) Declaration on Human Rights
states that ‘Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for
himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity’ (UN 1948). Meanwhile, the OECD
calls on MNCs to pay a wage that satisfies ‘basic needs of the workers and their families’ (OECD 2011).
Key concepts relevant to living wages are interpreted differently. For instance, while ‘basic needs’
is usually taken to comprise food, shelter and clothing, definitions used by NGOs vary with respect to
whether these needs include education, healthcare, childcare and transportation (Anker 2011, p. 21).
The flexibility of component definitions reflects the ‘essential relativism’ and contextual specificity of
the living wage concept and related living standards (Parker et al. 2016, p. 1, Anker 2011), since
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norms around living wages also differ across geography and sector. For instance, while definitions
centred on living wages in the global North often account for taxation in calculating the necessary
‘take home’ wage (Glasmeier 2004, Luce 2017), definitions for the global South often include a
requirement that a living wage is earned in a standard workweek (48 h) (Anker 2011, p. 23). Addition-
ally, NGO definitions focused on global South countries frequently include the need for discretionary
income or savings (Anker 2011, p. 21), which is vital in contexts where workers without savings are
vulnerable to exploitative labour practices (LeBaron 2021). International organisation standards
around living wages fall short in establishing and harmonising definitions for key concepts like a
‘standard’ workweek (beyond such general assertions as having a right to ‘reasonable limitation
of working hours’ (UN 1948)) and appropriate levels for savings/discretionary income.
In this study, we use the CCC definition of a living wage, which defines a living wage as one
‘earned in a standard working week (no more than 48 h) [that allows] a garment worker to be
able to buy food for herself and her family, pay the rent, pay for healthcare, clothing, transportation
and education and have a small amount of savings for when something unexpected happens’ (CCC
2014).1 The CCC’s definition is suitable for our study given that it: a) clearly demarcates what is
included with respect to ‘basic needs’; b) is appropriate for the garment industry, in which low-
wages are widespread, extensive and forced overtime is common, and workers’ lack of savings
can render them vulnerable to forced labour and overlapping forms of exploitation (Anner 2017,
2019, 2020, Mezzadri 2017, LeBaron 2020).
In adopting this definition, we intervene in the academic literature as follows: the paper focuses
on how living wages are implemented, moving beyond conceptual discussion regarding what con-
stitutes a living wage (Anker 2011) and whether living wages should be implemented (Adams 2017,
Brennan 2019). As such this paper aligns with scholarship on the current use by companies of living
wages in their business strategy and their attempts at integrating the payment of a living wage in
their practices (Egels-Zandén 2017, pp. 100–2) and makes a contribution regarding the question of
how (or not) living wages practices can be integrated in the fight against labour exploitation (Miller
and Williams 2009, Merk 2011a, Marshall 2019).
2.2. Data collection and analysis
We undertook this research to investigate how and to what extent MNCs had realised their commit-
ments to living wages. We selected the garment industry in light of sustained activist pressure on
MNCs to address low-waged work, which we thought might translate into progress towards living
wages compared to other sectors. We were aware that CCC planned to undertake research
around living wages and developed a partnership to co-design a survey of garment companies
that would give us traction to evaluate MNC progress towards living wages in the industry. As
well, we analysed publicly available company documentation relevant to living wages. By combining
survey data and public documentation, we can explore: a) how companies present their living wage
commitments; b) how company living wage commitments and living wage MSIs interact with
business models; c) the actions that companies claim they have taken to realise their living wage
commitments; and d) the outcomes associated with these actions.
There is very limited public information about the outcomes, impacts, and overall effectiveness of
MNC efforts to deliver living wages. Moreover, MNCs are challenging to research, particularly in
relation to labour standards. To understand the progress MNCs have made towards living wages,
we sought to gather information from them directly. Working with CCC, an established civil
society organisation with established relationships with garment MNCs around the world, facilitated
efficient access and communication with company representatives. CCC disseminated our survey to
a sample of 20 MNCs in December 2018 as part of their 2018/19 Wages Survey (Table 1). The sample
was selected by CCC to represent global garment MNCs with significant influence across sourcing
and retail markets, and ensuring variation across key garment sectors: sportswear, fast fashion,
luxury fashion, and online-only retail.
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14 of the 20 companies provided detailed answers to all or most survey questions, with some pro-
viding additional supporting documentation and evidence. Six companies did not provide direct
answers to the questions; however, all but one provided relevant information via email including
links to publicly available company documents around living wages. CCC informed companies
about the nature of the academic research collaboration and published their own report of the
survey data (CCC 2019).
Data analysis involved multiple steps. First, we read all responses to identify areas of convergence
and difference across companies. This informed the creation of ‘coding frame A’ comprised of six
indicators to enable direct comparison: 1) MSI participation; 2) living wage definitions; 3) living
wage strategies and benchmarks; 4) monitoring and enforcement of living wages; 5) transparency
and 6) freedom of association protections (which ensure workers can report wage violations and
underpayment).
Using the same sample of 20 companies, we next compiled data on each company’s policies,
business practices, and activities relevant to living wage payment using public information, includ-
ing supplier codes of conduct, sustainability reports, modern slavery reports, and relevant webpages.
The purpose was to understand and compare the degrees of alignment between living wage com-
mitments and overall company practice, such as whether supplier codes of conduct included wage
requirements. We also wanted to source missing information about company living wage commit-
ments where survey questions remained unanswered. We then coded the survey responses and
publicly available information from all 20 companies based on the above indicators, and cross-
checked survey responses against the information within our compiled dataset.
A key strategy reported by companies to realise their living wage commitments is participation in
MSIs; 18 of the 20 companies are associated with more than one MSI (see Table 2). To understand
their effectiveness in delivering living wages, we researched MSIs operating in the garment industry
that seek to increase wages for workers using publicly available online materials. This primarily con-
sisted of MSI websites and reports, with some secondary academic and news sources. Following
Fransen (2012), we use the term MSI broadly to cover initiatives with the following characteristics:
both for-profit and non-profit stakeholders (including unions, civil society groups, states and
global governance organisations) are involved; the involvement of for-profit stakeholders is volun-
tary, and the initiative aims to upgrade and enforce labour standards within the supply chains of the
for-profit stakeholders involved.
After collecting information about MSIs we created ‘coding frame B’ to provide a framework for
assessing the rigour and stringency of the initiative, including: a) whether the MSI employs robust
living wage benchmarks; b) whether the MSI’s enforcement strategy involves independent assess-
ments of suppliers; c) the extent of meaningful accountability and enforcement; and d) whether
structural features of the business model that affect the payment of living wages are addressed.
We compared this to information given in survey responses and in public information from the com-
panies to analyse the role of MSIs in delivering living wage commitments.
The findings we present are drawn from our analysis of the information provided in company
survey responses and from public information from companies and MSIs. Cross-interrogating this
body of data allows us to explore degrees of alignment between the data sources, to consider
company commitments to living wages in their own words and to evaluate the steps taken to
implement and enforce living wage commitments.
3. Theorising the effectiveness CSR
Critical political economy scholars have stressed the dangers and dark sides of CSR for workers, con-
sumers, and the planet (Bartley 2005, Burchell and Cook 2013, Lund-Thomsen 2013, Dauvergne and
LeBaron 2014, Jung and Kim 2016). When it comes to labour standards, this body of research stresses
that CSR initiatives: outsource governance beyond the state and can facilitate the erosion of state-
based regulation (Mayer et al. 2016, LeBaron and Rühmkorf 2017), consistently fail to deliver
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promised labour standards on the ground (Fridell 2007, Esbenshade 2012, Lund-Thomsen et al. 2012,
Bartley 2018), weaken unions and worker-led campaigns for labour rights (Esbenshade 2004, Anner
2012, Appelbaum and Lichtenstein 2016), and create an illusion of governance where significant
regulatory voids exist. More broadly, critical political economists have argued that CSR: ‘normalizes
and thereby recreates the dominant neoliberal-led development paradigm’ (Soederberg 2007); com-
prises a form of ‘stakeholder colonialism’ which elevates capitalist and colonial interests above those
of vulnerable stakeholders (Banerjee 2008, 2018); constitutes economic and cultural imperialism in
the buyer-supplier relation (Khan and Lund-Thomsen 2011); and perpetrates ‘slow violence’
against local environments and dispossessed populations (Gamu and Dauvergne 2018). Critical
veins of political economy scholarship see CSR as reflecting industry interest, rather than those of
workers or the public (Cutler et al. 1999).
Yet, political economy scholarship extolling the normative dangers of CSR has done little to alter
the optimism of scholars who see CSR as a promising means of ensuring and raising standards in
global supply chains (cf. Gifford et al. 2010). A large interdisciplinary literature split across manage-
ment and business studies, law, political science and other disciplines focuses on CSR’s positive
potential, seeing corporate engagement with stakeholders as a key site for ‘deliberative democracy’
(Scherer and Palazzo 2007) and a means of reorienting corporations beyond their shareholders and
narrow financial interests (Schoeneborn et al. 2020). This literature tends to conceptualise CSR initiat-
ives as a positive or neutral force within global governance, explaining any lacking progress as relat-
ing to procedure, design, or technical considerations that can be rectified (Short et al. 2020).
Debates about CSR’s role in the global economy would benefit from further evidence about its
on-the-ground effectiveness, and in particular, analysis of how far and in what ways CSR aims and
standards are realised for workers within supply chains. We see the question of whether CSR pro-
grammes will be effective as empirical, not one to be determined solely through theory. While critical
political economy scholarship often assumes a priori that CSR will be ineffective given that it reflects
corporate interests, other veins of literature reflect a prevailing yet unproven optimism about its role
and value in supply chains. Further empirical investigation of CSR effectiveness can deepen our
understanding. We undertake such an investigation here in relation to a relatively new and under-
studied feature of CSR related to living wages, including company commitments, codes of conduct,
and MSIs.
In this study, by effectiveness we are interested in whether CSR commitments and initiatives
achieve their stated aims and outcomes; in our case, whether CSR has led to living wages for
garment workers, or at least, meaningful progress towards them. Given widespread adoption of
CSR as a means of governing global production standards, it is important to investigate whether,
to what extent, and under what conditions company CSR commitments are being met on-the-
ground.
After all, studies that have investigated CSR effectiveness in relation to labour standards have
unearthed considerable problems finding that initiatives: fail to implement standards around
wages (LeBaron 2020); mislead consumers and policymakers about the extent to which agricultural
production relies on forced labour (LeBaron and Gore 2019); do little to uphold workers’ freedom of
association rights (Barrientos and Smith 2007, Anner 2012, Egels-Zandén and Merk 2014); and gen-
erate falsified or unreliable information about labour standards in supply chains (Judd and Kuruvilla
2020). In relation to MSIs, scholars have found the effectiveness of MSIs on improving labour stan-
dards is constrained by power asymmetries between stakeholders and workers, and MSIs carry
potentially harmful effects of crowding out unions (O’Rourke 2006); ‘are seldom able to identify
process rights violations’ (Egels-Zanden and Lindholm 2015, p. 38); and contain trade-offs that
shift initiatives ‘away from more radical… social goals… towards the need to create business
value’ (Riisgaard, Lund-Thomsen and Coe 2020, p. 231). Informed by these insights, we examine
the effectiveness of CSR living wage initiatives.
At the same time, we advance debates about CSR (in)effectiveness by asking what else CSR might
be accomplishing through its ineffectiveness, where it is indeed found to be falling short. Are
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companies weaponizing CSR commitments to deflect criticism? Are CSR commitments misleading
consumers and policymakers and leading to inaccurate understandings of labour practices within
global supply chains? How can we understand the relationship between CSR commitments and
business models?
As a first step towards exploring these questions, in the remainder of this article, we present our
evidence about CSR effectiveness related to living wages, noting that companies are failing to deliver
meaningful progress. This evidence, we contend, adds further weight to claims about CSR ineffec-
tiveness. But, we argue, the problem isn’t a straightforward one of CSR simply not working.
Rather, there is a need to explore why corporations are making CSR commitments they cannot
achieve in their current form, and the impact this is having on vulnerable workers in global
supply chains.
4. Findings
In this section we set out key findings from our analysis of the survey answers given by companies,
information presented in public company documents, and public information from MSIs. We find
that: 1) Companies are making only very modest changes to their relationships with suppliers and
workers and are insufficiently addressing the features of their business models that lead to low
wages and pose obstacles to living wages in supply chains; 2) Instead, companies have largely out-
sourced their living wage commitments to MSIs which lack robust enforcement mechanisms and
usually do not address purchasing practices; 3) Companies have diluted and distorted the definition
of ‘living wage’ thus enabling suppliers to continue to pay non-living wages; 4) Companies have ulti-
mately made limited progress towards achieving living wages. While we illustrate each finding in
turn, they are not discrete but intrinsically connected and mutually reinforcing.
4.1. Masking exploitative business models
Previous studies demonstrate that labour exploitation in the garment industry is rooted in prevailing
business models (cf. Anner 2019, LeBaron 2020), and especially in sourcing practices that concen-
trate value and profit at the top of supply chains (Selwyn et al. 2019). These studies highlight the
need for fundamental overhaul of garment company business models to facilitate the necessary
value distribution along the supply chain to achieve living wages, supported through measures to
benchmark wages and reform sourcing practices.
Indeed, previous research shows how global garment companies exert significant pressure upon
a wide base of suppliers through their purchasing practices (Hearson 2009, Raworth and Kidder 2009,
Barrientos et al. 2011). This pressure, characterised by Anner (2020) as a ‘pricing squeeze’ and a ‘sour-
cing squeeze’, can force suppliers to produce high volumes of goods for the low prices offered by
lead firms, which often fall below the costs of production, making it impossible to meet wage stan-
dards. Facing cost pressure from the top of the supply chain, suppliers cut corners on wages and use
cheaper subcontractors to keep costs low to secure andmaintain orders. Research also demonstrates
that long-term relationships between buyers and suppliers increases compliance with labour stan-
dards (Locke et al. 2009, Distelhorst and Locke 2018).
To explore whether and to what extent companies have adapted purchasing practices to achieve
living wage commitments, our survey asked companies if they make long-term sourcing commit-
ments at specific volumes to suppliers; whether they seek to limit the use of subcontractors in
the supply chain and consolidate their supplier base, and if they seek to limit the use of labour
contractors.
We found very limited evidence that living wage commitments have spurred change in the low-
cost and high-volume sourcing model through which companies profit. Indeed, purchasing practices
often exist in tension with companies’ living wage commitments and can undermine them. Compa-
nies were asked whether ‘freight on board’ prices paid per item are sufficient to allow for compliance
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with the company’s wage commitments through ring-fencing labour costs in negotiations with sup-
pliers. While nine companies stated they do ring-fence labour costs when determining prices per
item, only three currently use these cost calculations in purchasing.2 Of these three companies,
none employs a living wage benchmark which would ensure that all key components of a living
wage are covered. It thus appears that living wage provision has not yet been built into pricing nego-
tiations, and therefore, that CSR commitments to living wages have not translated into meaningful
improvements in suppliers’ ability to pay living wages.3
4.2. The ‘outsourcing’ of living wage commitments to MSIs
Whilst we find little evidence to suggest that the companies in our sample are modifying their pur-
chasing practices to realise living wage commitments, we find that they strongly seek to demon-
strate their commitment to living wages through their involvement with multiple MSIs (as Table 2
demonstrates). Across our sample – and across all company types – the survey answers of companies
and company documents place considerable emphasis upon involvement with MSIs to corroborate
how they are meeting and seeking to meet their commitments; a pattern we characterise as the out-
sourcing of living wage commitments to MSIs. Companies are already able to absolve some respon-
sibility for low wages and wage violations through outsourcing production to suppliers. The
additional outsourcing of their living wage commitment further muddies the waters of accountabil-
ity about who is ultimately responsible for garment workers receiving living wages, and raises ques-
tions about the effectiveness of MSIs as there is little evidence they are making meaningful progress
towards workers receiving living wages.
This willingness of companies to outsource their living wage commitments to MSIs is problematic
in light of well-documented shortcomings about MSIs (as outlined in Section 3). While all of the MSIs
in our study have different strategies for how to improve labour standards ranging from audit toolk-
its to better data collection, they are all voluntary and reliant on self-monitoring and self-reporting
by companies to show compliance with the MSI’s standards, and there is a severe lack of account-
ability when external monitoring is applied. Crucially, none of the MSIs require companies to make
changes to purchasing practices. For example, the Ethical Trade Initiative offers advice on respon-
sible purchasing practices to its members but implementing that advice is at the discretion of com-
panies. The Action, Collaboration, Transformation (ACT) initiative is more ambitious and seeks to
provide living wages for garment workers by striking industry-wide national collective bargaining
agreements (CBAs) that ACT members commit to align their purchasing practices with (ACT
2020). But in keeping with other MSIs the future effectiveness of ACT is an open question
because companies will self-report on their implementation of CBAs. In short, MSIs in our study
offer little guarantee of progress towards living wages given their reliance on self-reporting and
lacking enforcement.
Our analysis of survey answers shows a clear pattern of companies extensively citing their invol-
vement with MSIs – and often multiple MSIs – to evidence their commitment to living wages. Two
companies refer to MSIs in 22 of their answers to the survey’s 26 questions. When asked to supply
information about their purchasing practices that relate to meeting their wage commitments, many
companies answered with direct reference to their MSI associations suggesting that companies see
responsibility resting with the MSI and not the company.
Throughout the survey dataset, outsourcing responsibility for living wage commitments can be
observed particularly strongly in answers given by companies that are members of ACT. Despite
ACT being unable to identify any workers actually receiving higher wages as a result of their initiative
(ACT 2020) ACT members in our sample – comprising fast fashion, luxury and online-only companies
– frequently refer to ACT in very positive terms and cite their membership as evidence of their com-
mitment to living wages. When asked how they define a living wage and to provide details of where
their living wage commitment is publicly made, one company stated ‘Our central approach is the ACT
Initiative on Living Wages’ before continuing in the same answer to provide a detailed overview of
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the aims of ACT and to refer to the company’s founding membership of ACT. In a response to a
follow-up question which asked how the company monitors supplier compliance with this living
wage commitment, the company states ‘We do not measure the payment of living wages as of
yet although this will come through ACT as soon as the first industry-wide binding CBA is negotiated
and signed by the social partners in the ACT countries.’ The company’s answers are illustrative of
how ACT members pull the potential future CBA into the present as evidence of their commitment
to living wages for workers. Yet, several years after living wage commitments were made, no ACT
members are required to modify their purchasing practices because no CBAs have been agreed.
We also reviewed annual reports, sustainability reports and webpages of all 20 companies to
assess how MSI involvement is used to evidence living wage commitments. 12 of the 14 survey
respondents had webpages where MSI membership was displayed, and 10 make multiple mentions
of MSIs in company reports. Five of the six companies that did not respond to the survey refer to MSIs
in public reports and webpages. The majority of companies in our sample (17 out of 20) clearly pub-
licise their MSI membership to evidence action around wage improvement, despite the lack of evi-
dence provided to suggest that MSI involvement is leading to reform of purchasing practices and
crucially that this has led to any workers actually receiving living wages.
4.3. The dilution and distortion of living wage
The MSIs that companies are involved with have their own definitions for living wages and wage
requirements. And yet, whilst companies often draw on MSI definitions to inform their own living
wage definition, the two are frequently misaligned, which is surprising given the close alignment
presented by companies. Companies do not use standardised definitions for living wages and
instead use their own definitions which are often limited in scope and do not meet the criteria
for wages that sufficiently provide for workers and their families (see also Anker 2011). Our analysis
also shows significant discrepancy between how companies define a living wage and their codes of
conduct for suppliers. We find that the wage requirements placed upon suppliers in codes of
conduct are soft, allow room for interpretation and often aren’t mandatory. The significant variance
in how companies present their commitment to living wages whilst not providing evidence that they
are acting to reshape their purchasing practices accordingly has the effect of diluting what is under-
stood by a living wage. Furthermore, the lack of a common definition across companies and across
MSIs distorts the very meaning of the term ‘living wage’. This not only casts serious doubt about the
extent to which companies are significantly committed to make changes needed to realise their
living wage commitments, but also gives license to suppliers to continue to pay non-living wages.
Our survey asked companies to provide their definition of a living wage. Column 1 in Table 34
presents this information. It shows companies use multiple definitions and that across the
different company types in our sample there is no common understanding about what a living
wage for workers is. The company definitions are analysed against CCC’s living wage definition
that a living wage covers the worker’s basic needs; provides some discretionary income; covers
the needs of the worker’s family, and is earned in a standard working week (i.e. without overtime
being needed to top-up wages to a sufficient level). In their survey responses just three companies
provided a definition of a living wage that included all four necessary components of the CCC
definition.
Companies provided scant evidence about their use of wage benchmarking methodologies. In
the absence of requiring suppliers to pay wages in line with a calculated benchmark, suppliers
are expected to pay wages that meet criteria set out in codes of conduct. Table 3 presents the dis-
crepancies between the living wage definitions provided in company survey responses (Column 1)
and the expectations included in supplier codes of conducts for wages that workers must receive
(Column 2). 8 of the 14 survey respondents provided a living wage definition misaligned with
their own code of conduct. Just one company has a code of conduct that expects suppliers to
pay wages in accordance with the four components of a living wage outlined by CCC.5
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The wage requirements in codes of conduct are frequently vague and allow room for divergence
by suppliers, thus making an assessment of any noncompliance hard to discern and compliance hard
to enforce. The codes of conduct for eight companies in our sample contain an acknowledgement
that suppliers may not be able to pay wages that meet the requirements in the code. This effectively
licenses suppliers to pay non-living wages.6
Two companies provide suppliers with no or minimal guidance about the wages workers must
receive. The first, an online retailer, has a code of conduct that includes no details about wages
that suppliers must pay. The code of the second, a luxury garment company, states they will only
do business with suppliers that ‘provide wages and benefits that comply with any applicable law
and match the prevailing local manufacturing or finishing industry practices’; this grants significant
license to suppliers to pay sub-standard wages given that production often occurs in jurisdictions
where laws on worker compensation are lacking and unenforced, and where ‘prevailing… industry
practices’ routinely means low wages.
The analysis in Table 3 (Columns 3 and 4) also shows the frequent misalignment between
company supplier codes of conducts and the living wage definitions of MSIs that companies associ-
ate with and refer frequently to. We draw particular attention to the misalignment between the
codes of conduct of six of the seven companies in our study that are members of ACT and ACT’s
definition of a living wage. The misalignment is most pronounced with one company whose code
makes no reference to wages needing to meet the basic needs of a worker and their family, nor
provide discretionary income, thus falling far short of ACT’s living wage definition. When companies
place great emphasis upon their MSI affiliations as evidence of their commitment to living wages yet
do not align their supplier codes of conduct with those same MSIs it prompts further scepticism
about the strength of those commitments.
Table 3. Company and MSI wage requirements analysed against the CCC definition of a living wage.b
Key:
CCC’s living wage definition is comprised of four necessary components. The wage must: 1 – cover the basic needs of the worker;
2 – provide discretionary income; 3 – cover the needs of the worker’s family; 4 – be earned in a standard working week.
MSIs require company supplier codes of conduct to pay wages that include the following components of the CCC definition:
Action, Collaboration,
Transformation (ACT): 1,
2, 3 & 4
Fair Labor Association







provided in their survey
response
Wage criteria included
in their Supplier Code
of Conduct (SCoC) MSI associations
Does the SCoC align
with the living wage
definition of the MSI?
Adidas 1,2 1,2,4* FLA, FWN yes, yes
C&A 1,2,3,4 1,2,3,4 ACT, ETI yes, yes
Decathlon 1 1 - -
G-Star RAW 1,2,3,4 1,2 FWN yes
Gucci 1,2,4 1,2,4 FWN yes
H&M 1,2,3,4 1,2,3 ACT, FWN, ETI no, yes, yes
Inditex 1,2,3 1,2,3,4 ACT, ETI no, yes
Nike 1,2 1,2,4* FLA yes
Primark 1,2,3 1,2,4 ACT, ETI no, yes
Puma 1,2,4 1,2,4* FWN, FLA yes, yes
PVH 1,2,4 1,2,4* ACT, FLA no, yes
Tchibo 1,2,3 1,2,3,4 ACT, ETI no, yes
Under Armour 1,2,4 1,2,4* FLA yes
Uniqlo 1,2 1 FLA no
Amazon Did not respond – – –
Fruit of the Loom Did not respond 1,2,4 FLA yes
GAP Did not respond 1,2* ETI yes
Hugo Boss Did not respond 1,2,4* FLA yes
Levi Strauss Did not respond – – –
Zalando Did not respond 4 ACT no
bAn earlier version of Table 4 appeared in Edwards, Hunt & LeBaron (2019).
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4.4. Lacking progress
In assessing whether companies are modifying their purchasing practices in ways that could better
achieve the payment of living wages to workers, we also considered the evidence they presented to
directly substantiate their progress in meeting their commitments. We found limited signs of pro-
gress. Companies were asked if they have a public roadmap for how, and by when, they will
achieve living wages for all workers in their supplier network, but none provided a clear timeline
for how and by when this goal would be met. Across all companies in our sample, the lack of
public roadmaps, published indicators of progress and transparent information about suppliers
means it is extremely difficult to make meaningful assessments about any progress companies
may be making.
Transparent publication of information about suppliers is a key data source for external observers
– whether NGOs, workers or unions – to monitor wages and labour standards. Companies were
asked if they publish information about suppliers including addresses, parent company, products
supplied, the number of workers employed and crucially, wage data. Whilst 15 companies publish
a supplier list with addresses, only seven publish supplier information below Tier 1. No company
publishes fine-grained wage data at the supplier-level and just four companies publish any form
of wage data.7
Whilst most companies in our sample do not publish detailed information about suppliers, com-
panies do monitor supplier compliance with their wage requirements through social auditing; a tool
well-documented to be sub-optimal for detecting and remediating non-compliance issues in supply
chains (Anner 2017, LeBaron et al. 2017). Just two companies in our sample solely use unannounced
audits and only nine stated that audits may involve worker interviews. Only five companies
confirmed they audit suppliers below Tier 1. This raises questions about the accuracy of claims
about labour standards compliance because previous research documents that workers are more
vulnerable to exploitation below Tier 1.
Furthermore, whilst all 20 companies use auditing, only 12 use compliance performance to rank
suppliers which may determine the frequency and volume of future orders and whether the supplier
remains within their network. The fact that not all companies in our sample use compliance perform-
ance to determine whether suppliers receive orders raises further serious questions about the will-
ingness in the industry for fundamental reform of purchasing practices to meet living wage
commitments and increase labour standards.
5. Conclusion
An influential definition of CSR comes from David Vogel, who defines it as ‘practices that improve the
workplace and benefit society in ways that go above and beyond what companies are legally
required to do’ (Vogel 2005, p. 2). His definition assumes that CSR leads to improved conditions
for workers. But how should we understand CSR commitments and initiatives that don’t lead to
improvements?
Returning to our key focus of how we can understand garment company actions to deliver recent
commitments to living wages in their supply chains, we found very little evidence that companies
followed their commitments with meaningful action. Not only are companies largely failing to
modify the practices directly within their control that lead to sub-living wages being paid, but
across the documentation from companies and MSIs, there was almost no evidence that commit-
ments to living wages are actually being realised on-the-ground, or even that the commercial pre-
conditions to making this possible were being established. This underscores the need for scholars
concerned with CSR to look beyond procedural questions, such as around the design and uptake
of MSIs and codes of conduct, and to investigate effectiveness. In our case, any initial optimism
about garment company living wage commitments and the launching of MSIs is outweighed by
the seriously lacking evidence that they are delivering living wages for workers.
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The ineffectiveness of these commitments and failure of companies to make structural changes in
their business models cannot be viewed in isolation. Companies yield immense power over supply
chains and over working conditions in the global economy more broadly. Further research is
required to assess whether and how CSR may help to entrench the business model that leads to per-
sistently low wages; not just passively failing to improve labour standards but actively stabilising and
facilitating garment industry supply chains that are widely documented to lead to labour exploita-
tion. We have argued that fine-grained analysis of the actions taken by companies to realise their
commitments to pay living wages to workers within their supply chains provides new insights
into how corporations are exerting power in the global economy. Features of CSR often taken to
be benign—such as incrementalism, density and volume of information and activity, and adopting
multiple standards— are in fact worrisome insofar as they give the impression that problems like
illegally low wages are being addressed when they are not. We have argued that garment companies
are using these features of CSR as a strategy to shield themselves from pressures to significantly
reform their highly profitable business model. Incrementalism reflects not a slow but steady
process of changing complex systems, as is often assumed, but rather, a deliberate strategy to
draw out commitments and create the impression that meaningful change is occurring while corpor-
ations continue to profit.
Notes
1. Since our analysis was conducted CCC have adopted the Asia Floor Wage Alliance’s definition for what a living
wage in the garment industry should comprise (see https://cleanclothes.org/poverty-wages). The version used
in our study is available at https://archive.cleanclothes.org/livingwage.
2. Six of the nine companies are members of ACT and so are waiting for CBA negotiations to conclude before fac-
toring any agreed wage level into FOB prices.
3. Information in this section refers to the 14 survey respondents. Information about purchasing practices was not
available publicly for non-respondents.
4. An earlier version of Table 3 appeared in Edwards et al. (2019). The MSIs included were the most prominent in
company survey responses.
5. C&A meets the CCC definition because they state that a standard week must not exceed ‘48 h per week exclud-
ing overtime’. The codes of conduct of H&M, Inditex and Tchibo refer to all four components of CCC’s definition
but are more imprecise about what a standard working work entails. For example, Inditex state ‘Manufacturers
and suppliers shall not require their employees to work, as a rule of thumb, in excess of 48 h a week (emphasis
added)’.
6. The companies are indicated in Column 2 of Table 3 with an asterisk.
7. One company publishes aggregated regional data on the percentage of its suppliers that comply with the wages
section of its code of conduct. Two companies publish country-level data comparing workers’ wages with
average minimum wages. A fourth company publishes information about wage violations by suppliers but
not about actual wages paid.
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